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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred witji jurisdiction over
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78A-4-103(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF! REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred by Concluding that an

objective standard is to be exclusively utilized when ruling on a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

The appellate court reviews a

trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for
abuse of discretion.
P.2d 556.

State

v.

Benvenuto,

1999 UT 60, 1fl0, 983

However, the trial court's interpretation of statutes,

rules, or binding case law presents a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness.

See State

114 P.3d 585 (quoting State
528) (statute); Rushton

v.

P.2d 1201 (statute); State

v. Merrill,

v. Ostler,
Salt

2001 UT 68, K5# 31 P.3d

Lake County,

v. Leyva,

(binding case law); and Stevenson

2005 UT 34, fl2,

1999 UT 36, ^17, 977

951 P.2d [738, 741 (Utah 1997)
v. Goodson\,

924 P.2d 339, 346

(Utah 1996) (binding case law).
Preservation

of Issue

Citation

or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review:

Mr. Kucharski preserved this issue by way off Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea and supporting Memorandum set fourth in the record at
R. 97-101.

1

2.

Whether

the

sentencing

court,

by

failing

to

duly

consider the objections to the presentence report and thereby
failing to specifically resolve them on the record, failed to
comply

with

its

legal

duty

to

investigation report objections.

properly

resolve

presentence

"Whether the sentencing court

properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record the
accuracy of contested
question

of

law

[the

appellate

State v. Veteto,

correctness."
(citing State

that

information in sentencing

v.

Kohl,

Preservation of Issue

court]

reports

is a

review[s]

for

2000 UT 62, fl3, 6 P. 3d 1133

2000 UT 35, f32, 999 P.2d 7 ) .

Citation

or Statement

of Grounds for

Review:

Mr. Kucharski preserved this issue by way of his Objection to
Presentence Report set forth at R. 138-48.
3.

Whether trial counsel, to the extent that there was no

affirmative request that the sentencing court exercise its fact
finding

function to resolve

the remaining presentence

report

objections, denied Mr. Kucharski of his Sixth Amendment right to
the effective assistance of counsel.

To make such a showing, a

defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient
performance, falling below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was
prejudicial.

Bundy

v. DeLand,

763 P.2d 803

(Utah 1988).

appellate court reviews such a claim as a matter of law.
2

State

The
v.

Robertson,

2005 UT App 419, f5, 122 P.3d 895; State

1999 UT 32, 1)20, 984 P.2d 376; State

v.

Strain,

v.

Maestas,

885 P.2d 810, 814

(Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Preservation
Issues

of Issue

Citation

or Statement

of grounds

involving claims of

ineffective

assistance

for

Review:

of counsel

constitute an exception to the preservation rijile and as such may
be raised for the first time on appeal.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
U.S. Const. amend. VI
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, if
any, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the
body and arguments of the instant Brief of Apjpellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

State

charged

Mr.

Kucharski

with

one

count

of

Communications Fraud, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-18-1801.

Mr. Kucharski pleaded not guilty to the

charge.
On October 25, 2005, Mr. Kucharski appeared with appointed
trial counsel before the district court pursUant to a negotiated
plea and entered a plea of no contest to Communications Fraud, a
third-degree felony.
3

Thereafter, Mr. Kucharski appeared before the district court
m

conjunction with the appearance of newly retained trial counsel

and thereafter

filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.

The

district court denied the Motion.
At sentencing, the district court imposed an indeterminate
term of zero to five years m
Kucharski.

the Utah State Prison on Mr.

Mr. Kucharski filed a timely pro se Notice of Appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The

State

charged

Mr. Kucharski

with

one

count of

Communications Fraud, a second-degree felony, m violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-18-1801 (R. 1). See Information, R. 1, a true and
correct copy of which is attached as Addendum A to this Brief of
Appellant.
2.

The basis for the aforementioned charge arose out of the

State's allegation that Mr. Kucharski, m

March 2004, agreed to

and then failed to install windows for the alleged victim for
which Mr. Kucharski took and cashed a check (R. 1-2).
3.

Mr. Kucharski subsequently pleaded not guilty to the

charge (R. 11).
4.

On

October

25,

2 005,

Mr.

Kucharski

appeared

with

appointed trial counsel before the district court pursuant to a

4

negotiated plea and entered a plea of no contest): to Communications
Fraud, a third-degree felony (R. 208:3-5).
5.
an

As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Kilicharski would have

''affirmative

402

Motion

upon

successful

completion

of

probation" with the State recommendation of ^o prison and no
incarceration (R. 30).
6.

The same day Mr. Kucharski entered the no contest plea,

he executed a Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and
Certificate of Counsel (R. 28-32) . See Statement of Defendant in
Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel, R. 28-32, a
true and correct copy of which is attached as| Addendum B to this
Brief of Appellant.
7.

Mr. Kucharski failed to appear fd>r sentencing after

which the court issued a no bail bench warrant (R. 33).
8.

After arrest, Mr. Kucharski appeared before the district

court in conjunction with the appearance of newly retained trial
counsel, who informed the court of Mr. Kupharski's desire to
withdraw the no contest plea (R. 208:11-12).
9.

On

October

5,

2 0 06,

Mr.

Kucharjski,

through

trial

counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and supporting
Memorandum, arguing that Mr. Kucharski did n|ot voluntarily enter
his guilty plea (R. 97-101).

5

10.

That same day, Mr. Kucharski, through trial counsel,

filed a Motion to Dismiss based on a lack of jurisdiction (R. 10205) .
11.

The State responded in opposition to the Motions (R.

112-16).
12.

On October 19, 2006, the district court entertained

arguments on the Motions (R. 208:14:10-15).
13.

Addressing the merits of the Motion to Dismiss, Mr.

Kucharski's trial counsel essentially conceded jurisdiction but
argued that venue was improper (R. 208:14-15).
14.

During the hearing on the Motion to withdraw the no

contest plea, Mr. Kucharski testified that his appointed trial
counsel had failed to subpoena witnesses he had provided to his
appointed trial counsel, which, in turn, provided him with no
other option but to plead guilty (R. 208:18-19).
15.

Appointed

trial

counsel, who was

also

called

as a

witness, testified that he did not subpoena any witnesses due to
Mr. Kucharski's acceptance of the negotiated plea, "which would
effectively reduce the conviction down to a class A misdemeanor."
(R. 208:33:1-8) .l

Appointed trial counsel subsequently admitted that he did not
talk to all of the witnesses provided to him by Mr. Kucharski but
that the ones he contacted would not have been beneficial to the
matter (R. 208 :45-46) .
6

16.

The district court denied the Motion to Withdraw Guilty

Plea, concluding that an objective standard id to be utilized in
the course of considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea (R.
208:57-58).2

See transcript of district court^s ruling on Motion

to Withdraw Guilty Plea, R. 208:57-58, a true find correct copy of
which is attached as Addendum C to this Brief of Appellant.
17.

In

conclusion,

the

trial

court

directed

that

a

Presentence Report be prepared for sentencing (R. 208:58-59).
18.
filed

On March 13, 2007, Mr. Kucharski, thfough trial counsel,

an Objection

to

Presentence

Report

(R. 138-48) .

See

Objection to Presentence Report, R. 138-48, a true and correct
copy

of

which

is

attached

as Addendum

D

to

this

Brief

of

Appellant.
19.

At sentencing, without addressing the objections to the

Presentence Report, the district court sentenced Mr. Kucharski to
an indeterminate term of zero to five year$ in the Utah State
Prison (R. 208:80-81).
20.

The Sentence was signed by the district court on March

29, 2007, and subsequently entered on April 13, 2007 (R. 168-69).
21.

On May 10, 200, Mr. Kucharski fitLed a timely pro se

Notice of Appeal (R. 175-76).
2

The trial court ruled that the denial of' the Motion to withdraw
the guilty plea caused the Motion to Di$miss to be moot (R.
208:58:20-23) .
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court erred by concluding that an objective

standard is to be exclusively utilized when ruling on a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea.

By so doing, the trial court failed to

utilize at least a mixed objective-subjective

standard in the

course of considering Mr. Kucharski's Motion to withdraw his plea
of no contest.

By utilizing a purely objective standard in the

course of ruling on the Motion, the trial court failed to consider
unrefutted testimony that appointed trial counsel did not talk
with and subpoena defense witnesses prior to the scheduled trial.
Only on the eve of trial did Mr. Kucharski learn that none of his
requested witnesses had been subpoenaed for trial.

Consequently,

Mr. Kucharski did not enter his no contest plea of his own free
and choice.

Rather, the plea was entered involuntarily under the

duress of appointed trial counsel's failure to investigate and
subpoena requested defense witnesses.
2.

By

failing

to duly consider

the objections

to the

presentence report and thereby failing to specifically resolve
them on the record, the sentencing court failed to comply with its
legal duty to properly resolve presentence investigation report
objections.

The record demonstrates that the sentencing court

failed to duly consider all the inaccuracies set forth in the
Presentence Report.
8

After recognizing that the objections h^d been filed, the
district

court

subsequently

sentenced

Mr.

Kucharski

to

an

indeterminate term of zero to five years in theiUtah State Prison.
The

sentencing

judge's

general

statement

concerning

inaccuracies of Mr. Kucharski's report is insufficient.

the

In fact,

the sentencing judge failed to make the specific findings on the
record as mandated by statute.

By failing to duly consider the

inaccuracies, the sentencing court did not compjly with its duty to
properly resolve Mr. Kucharski's objections.
3.

To the extent that there was no affltfmative request that

the sentencing court exercise its fact finding[function to resolve
the remaining presentence report objections, trial counsel denied
Mr.

Kucharski

of his Sixth Amendment

assistance of counsel.

right

to the effective

Trial counsel's faiLlure fell below an

objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.

This is

demonstrated by existing Utah case law, as previously discussed,
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a), and the
underlying factual circumstances of this case.
But for counsel's unprofessional failure to request that the
sentencing court utilize its fact finding function, the result at
sentencing would have been different.

AP&P, I among other things,
I

failed to accurately describe Mr. Kucharski's criminal history and
attitude-orientation in the course of its evaluative assessment.

Had the sentencing court been alerted of its obligation, the court
more likely than not would have duly considered the inaccuracies
set forth in the presentence investigation report, which, in turn,
would

have

allowed

the

sentencing

court

accurately consider AP&P's recommendation

to

more

fully

and

for imprisonment at

sentencing.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT AN
OBJECTIVE STANDARD IS TO BE EXCLUSIVELY UTILIZED
WHEN RULING ON A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA,

The appellate court reviews the trial court's denial of a
motion

to

withdraw

a guilty
State

discretion standard.

plea

pursuant

v. Benvenuto,

to

an

abuse-of-

1999 UT 60, ^10, 983

P. 2d 556. Nevertheless, when the trial court's denial involves an
interpretation of a statute or binding case law, the appellate
court is presented with a question of law, which it reviews for
correctness.
(quoting State

See State v. Merrill,
v.

Ostler,

interpretation); Rushton

2005 UT 34, fl2, 114 P.3d 585

2001 UT 68, f5, 31 P.3d 528) (statutory
v. Salt Lake County,

P.2d 1201 (statutory interpretation); State
738,

74]

(Utah

1997)

Stevenson v. Goodson,

(binding

case

law

1999 UT 36, ^[17, 977
v.

Leyva,

951 P.2d

interpretation); and

924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996) (binding case

law interpretation).

10

Before

accepting

a

guilty

plea,

the

determine that "the plea is voluntarily made"
P. 11(e) (2) .

u

trial

court

must

See Utah R. Crim.

[T]he substantive goal of rule tLl is to ensure that

defendants know of their rights and thereby Understand the basic
consequences of their decision to plead guilty)."
2000 UT 88, fll, 22 P. 3d 1242.

State

v.

Visser,

"The trial coufrt's compliance with

Rule 11 does not foreclose the possibility tfhe court abused its
discretion in refusing the defendant's moti pn

[to withdraw the
State

guilty plea] if his plea was in fact invo JLuntary."
Thorup,

841 P. 2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 19921), cert,

P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).

Moreover,

ux

denied,

v.
853

f or a plea of guilty to be

valid it must appear that the accused had a clear understanding of
the charge and without undue influence, coercion, or improper
inducement voluntarily entered such plea.'"
P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,
(Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Forsyth,

State
denied,

v.

Thorup,

841

853 P.2d 897

560|P.2d 337, 338 (Utah

1977) ) .
Mr. Kucharski, through trial counsel, iiled a timely Motion
to Withdraw Guilty Plea and supporting Memorandum, arguing that he
did not voluntarily enter the guilty plea due to appointed trial
counsel's failure to subpoena witnesses in preparation for trial
(R.

97-101) .

At

the

hearing

on

the Motion,

Mr.

Kucharski

testified that his appointed trial counsel Had failed to subpoena

11

witnesses

he had provided

to appointed

trial

counsel, which

resulted in him having no other option but to plead guilty (R.
208:18-19).

Appointed trial counsel, who was also called as a

witness, testified that he did not subpoena any witnesses due to
Mr. Kucharski's acceptance of the negotiated plea, "which would
effectively reduce the conviction down to a class A misdemeanor."
(R. 208:33:l-8) .
Immediately following the hearing, the trial court denied the
Motion, concluding that an objective standard is to be exclusively
utilized in the course of considering a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea

(R. 208:57-58).

In the course of its ruling, the

trial court stated:
Unless there is something from the Utah Supreme
Court or the U.S. Supreme Court or the Utah Court
of Appeals that says that a judge who asks these
questions, goes through what the judge is supposed
to go trough [sic] with this form of plea
affidavit that we have, and gets statements from
the defendant, I believe that there's no -- no
standard that says that I have to then go back
secondhand and say if somebody later after the
fact says, judge what I told you was a lie and I
really didn't mean it, that it can't be -- I can't
see how it can be a subjective standard because if
it is a subjective standard, then every person
that we have asked and gone through, you know,
hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of defendants
over the last number of years, then every one of
them can come back and say, well, judge, despite
that, that wasn't true.
See R. 208:57-58.

12

According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13 -6 .(2) (a) ,

U

A plea of

guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upoii leave of the court
and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."
Prior case law is somewhat more instructive on the matter.
State

v. Thurman,

In

911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996), thk Utah Supreme Court

held that the guilty plea at issue on appeal was not knowing
because the defendant did not understand the elements of the crime
in spite of his unequivocal statements to th[e contrary.
375.

Id.

at

Significantly, the Court, in support ofi its holding, placed

substantial importance on defendant's repeated statements that he
did not have the requisite intent and his specific refusal to
admit to certain consequences.

Id.;

see

also

State

v.

Martinez,

2001 UT 12, fl8, 26 P.3d 203 (relying on defendant's declarations
that he "didn't want to go through a trial because [he] didn't
want to put [the victim's mother] . . . through the emotion and go
through the hurt" in the course of affirming J trial court's denial
of motion to withdraw guilty plea).
Thorup,

Additionally, in State

841 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), clert.

denied,

v.

853 P.2d

897 (Utah 1993), this Court, in the course of affirming the denial
of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, ^tated the following:
As to the assertion that
[defendant's]
attorney used undue influence, the evidence
presented shows nothing more than an attorney
counseling the defendant and his family with
regard to what he considers tfo be the best

13

approach, knowing
all
of
the
facts
from
the
defendant's
point
of
view
and
giving
his
considered judgment and advice to the defendant
and his family that the plea barg[a]m was m the
defendant's best interest . . . .
The court could
not find from evidence presented on this question
that [defendant's attorney] in any way abandoned
his representation for economic reasons or because
of pressures from the family to change his advice
and reject the plea bargain and enter a plea of
not guilty.
Id.

at 748.
In light of the foregoing Utah case law, the trial court

failed to utilize at least a mixed objective-subjective standard
in the course of considering Mr. Kucharski's Motion to withdraw
his plea of no contest.
in

the

course

of

By utilizing a purely objective standard

ruling

on

the

Motion,

misinterpreted

the applicable

statutory

applicable

such

and

to

an

issue

the

trial

and binding

thereby

failed

to

court

case law
consider

unrefutted testimony that appointed trial counsel did not talk
with and thereby subpoena defense witnesses prior to the scheduled
trial.
of

his

Only on the eve of trial did Mr. Kucharski learn that none
requested

witnesses

had

been

subpoenaed

for

trial.

Consequently, Mr. Kucharski did not enter his no contest plea of
his own

free and and choice.

involuntarily

under

the

Rather, the plea was entered

duress

of

appointed

trial

counsel's

failure to investigate and subpoena requested defense witnesses.
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II.

BY FAILING TO DULY CONSIDER THE OBJECTIONS TO THE
PRESENTENCE
REPORT
AND
THEREBY
FAILING
TO
SPECIFICALLY RESOLVE THEM ON TH^ RECORD, THE
SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WlTH ITS LEGAL
DUTY TO PROPERLY RESOLVE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
REPORT OBJECTIONS.

According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a), which provides
in relevant part:
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have nop been resolved
by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of
the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department.
If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot
be resolved, the court shall make |a determination
of relevance and accuracy on the rbcord.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a); see also
App 206, f26#

94 P. 3d 295.

Statfe v. Maroney,

2004 UT

"Whether the trial court properly

complied with a legal duty to resolve on the record the accuracy
of contested information in sentencing reports is a question of
law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness."
v. Veteto,

2000 UT 62, f 13 # 6 P. 3d 1133 (c'iting State

v.

State
Kohl,

2000 UT 35, 1|32, 999 P.2d 7 ) .
A.

Duty to Consider Objections to Presentence
Investigation Report

As a matter of compliance, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a),
"requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections
I
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the

15

information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record
whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing."
State

v.

Jaeger,

1999 UT 1, ^44, 973 P. 2d 404; State

2004 UT App 206, f26, 94 P. 3d 295.

v.

Maroney,

"If a party fails to challenge

the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time
of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived."

See

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (b) .
B.

Failure of Sentencing Judge to Duly Consider
Objections and Resolve the Inaccuracies

The record demonstrates that the sentencing court failed to
duly

consider

Report.

the

Prior

to

inaccuracies

set

forth

in the

sentencing,

Mr.

Kucharski,

Presentence

through

newly

retained counsel, filed an 10-page Objection to Presentence Report
(R. 138-48).

Some of the objections appear to have been resolved

but, contrary to counsel's representation at sentencing, not all
of the objections were resolved as contemplated by Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1.
After recognizing that the objections had been filed, the
district

court

subsequently

sentenced

Mr.

Kucharski

to

an

indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison.
The

sentencing

judge's

general

statement

concerning

inaccuracies of Mr. Kucharski's case is insufficient.
v. Veteto,

2000 UT 62, fl4, 6 P.3d 1137.
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Cf.

the
State

In fact, the sentencing

judge "failed to make the specific finding^ on the record as
mandated by the statute."

Id.

at fl5.

By failing to duly

consider the inaccuracies, the sentencing c cpurt did not comply
with its duty to properly resolve Mr. Kuchar^k i's objections.

III. TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE WAS #0 AFFIRMATIVE
REQUEST THAT THE SENTENCING COUR? EXERCISE ITS
FACT FINDING FUNCTION TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING
PRESENTENCE REPORT OBJECTIONS, TRIAL COUNSEL
DENIED MR. KUCHARSKI OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test
for determining when a defendant's

Sixth Amendment3 right to

effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 2064.

Id.

at 687, 104

This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a

defendant to show "first, that his counsel (rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, wh|ich performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
Bundy

v.

Deland,

); State

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 19

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State
P.2d

1113, 1119

(Utah Ct. App.

1995).

rt

v.

v.
Wright,

Perry,
893

[T]he right to the

The Sixth Amendment to the United Stated Constitution states in
relevant part that u[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
17

effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused

to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair

sentencing.

Lockhart

v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct.

838, 842, (1993).
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must
"'identify the acts or omissions7 which, under the circumstances,
'show

that

counsel's

representation

standard of reasonableness. "'

State

(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland,

fell

below

v. Templin,

an

objective

805 P. 2d 182, 186

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct.

at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).

A defendant must "overcome

the

counsel

strong

presumption

that

trial

rendered

adequate

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment."

State

v,

497

Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,

U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant

must

proffer

sufficient

reasonable probability that, but

evidence

for counsel's

to

support

u

a

unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland,
at 187.

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,
U

805 P.2d

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome."
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons

v. Barnes,
18

Strickland,

466 U.S. at

871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah

1994), cert, denied,
Frame,

513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 4J31 (1994); State v.

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
To the extent that trial counsel failled to specifically

request

that

the

sentencing

court

exercis^ its

fact

finding

function to resolve the remaining inaccuracie^ in the presentence
report, he committed ineffective assistance of counsel.

Trial

counsel's failure fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment.

This is demonstrated by existing Utah case
I
law, as previously discussed, the plain languajge of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(6)(a), and the underlying factual circumstances of this

case,
But for counsel's unprofessional failure) to request that the
sentencing court utilize its fact finding function, the result at
sentencing would have been different.

AP&P, among other things,

failed to accurately describe Mr. Kucharski's criminal history and
attitude-orientation in the course of its evaluative assessment.
I
Had the sentencing court been alerted of its obligation, the
court

more

likely

than

not

would

have

duly

considered

the

inaccuracies set forth in the presentence investigation report,
which, in turn, would have allowed the sentencing court to more
fully and
accurately
consider
imprisonment at sentencing.

19

AP&P's

recommendation

for

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Kucharski respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion to
Withdrav/ Guilty Plea and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this Court's determination.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th da

June, 2 0 0 8
& WIGGINS, P.C,

L jWiq^jms

^ys ~r*Qr Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prbpaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF QF APPELLANT to the
following on this /flQ day of July, 2008:
Mr. J. Frederic Voro^, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City,
*4114-0854
Counsel for t"
tte of Utah
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ADDENDA
Addendum A:
Addendum B:
Addendum C:
Addendum D:

Information
Statement of Defendant iri Support of Guilty
Plea and Certificate of Counsel
Transcript of district court's ruling on
Motion to Withdraw Guilty- Plea
Objection to Presentence Heport
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P. O Box 618
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone (801)451-4300
Fax:
(801)451-4328
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF fJTAH
Bail:
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
INFORMATION
vs.
EDDIE G. KUCHARSKI
Case No
DOB 07/27/1977
OTN
Defendant

DHhol^O^

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant,
either directly or as a party, during March through May, 2004 at County |of Davis, State of Utah,
committed the crime of:

TlK—

iifj*f

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, (542) 76-10-1801 UCA.Ia « ^ j f i degree felony,
as follows:

That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant intentionally, knowingly or

recklessly devised a scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain |from another money or
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, and who, as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with
a person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud; '"]TiP-and the value of the loss or the thing sought to be obtained was or excee d^d S f , 0 0 0 ^ t ^ ^ ^ ®
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Lynn Hooper.
Authorized September 18, 2
for presentment and

Deputy Davis County Attorney

S (

^^
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FILED
OCT 2 5 2005
Layton District Court
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL!DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OH GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs,
EDDIE G.KUCHARSKI
Defendant.

I, EDDIE G. KUCIIARSKI, hereby acknowledge and certify that I havi been advised of and that
I understand the following facts and rights:
6

Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s):

Crime & Statutory
Provision

(\ miwuri v^ikr

Degree

«
-B.

Punishment

O

i

UJ

!

Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

fYtoJ}

I

o
Q

i

UJ

[ c* a:

5<

'*fe|(*/f oS^jJ'kwt fifoj

feu

52
o

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against mc. I havte read it, or had it read to
mc, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty.
The dements of the crimefa) to which I am pleading guilty are; /

&k
ji/k/Y- mffakZL
Shi.^A^Us

syirJMIrtm.

WUj&Vt

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting Wat I comnktted the crimc(s) listed
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to apeept my guilty pica and
prove the elements of the crimc(s) to which I am pleading guilty;

OCT-25-05 TUE 08:51 ATI

1.
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In March of 2004, the defendant met with the victim and represented that he was employed

with Champion Windows and that they would install windows at the victim's home. The victim agreed to
have the windows installed and agreed to pay $8,335.00 as down payment and to cover the cost of the
windows.
2.

Defendant insisted that the victim make the check out in his name rather than Champion

Windows. The victim made the check payable to defendant and defendant cashed the check.
3.

Defendant then failed to produce the windows or do any work on defendant's home. In

addition, the victim has been unable to contact the defendant and no longer knows his whereabouts.
When Champion Windows was contacted, they slated that defendant did work for them but as of May 27>
2004 he had quit and moved away.
4.

In addition, Champion Windows stated that they have never received a work order or request

to do work at the victim's home. That defendant did not turn over any money from the victim or order
any windows or other material on behalf of the victim.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering this pica voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the
following rights;
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if 1 cannot afford
one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to mc. I understand that I might later, if the
judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and cnme(s) to which I am pleading guilty. I also
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea.
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is £^\f\A.

/ W / ^ n A u)^>

My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilty pica.
Jury Trfali 1 know that I have a right to a speedy and public (rial by an impartial (unbiased) jury
and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial,
(a) 1 would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and (b) my attorney,
or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the
witnesses who testified against mc.
Right to compel witnesses. I know thai if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I
chose to and I woidd be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privUcgo against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one
2
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could make mc testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know th^t if I chose not to testiry,
the jury would be told that Ihey could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am
presumed innocent until the Slate proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). Jf I choose to fight the
charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty/' and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State
would have the burden of proving each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is
before a jury, Ihe verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting
that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted bV a jury or judge, I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence, If 1 could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State
would pay those costs for me, I understand that I am giving up my right to Appeal my conviction if I
plead guilty.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and
constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequence! of Entering a Guilty Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which
1 am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be
subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know myl sentence may include a
prison term, fine, or both,
I know that in addition to a fine, an cighly-fivc percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimc(s), including
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison teiins. I know that if there is more jhan one crime involved,
the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time
(concurrently). 1 know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crirrje that I plead to. I also
know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offeiise of which I have been
convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me, If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless |the court finds and states
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
Pica bargain. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between rrn/self and the prosecuting
attorney, All the promises, duties, and provisions of ihe plea bargain, if any, aj-e fully contained in this
statement, including those explained below:

.

T lv„cmyf

CriiMPo(ftk\. tf ptjifojihwj

,

~

r .

_ ,
/hJf'AJ/jrn^J(«t%^.

$'AAA
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Trial judge not bound. 1 know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any
opinions they express to mc as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant5! Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influence
of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this
statement have been made to mc.
I have road this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements arc correct,
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
, fl
1 any^ft years of age, I have attended school through the /(
grade, I can read and
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me.
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment
when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or
intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding
these proceedings and the consequences of my pica. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or
impairment that would prevent mc from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entering my plea,
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty pica, I must move to withdraw my pica before
my sentence is announced. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show it was not knowingly
and voluntarily made.
w;
<r\
,
^^^
Dated t h i s ^ ^ j : day of C'Crd

O^.

_, 2 0 0 ^

DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that 1 am the attorney for EDDIE Q, KUCHARSKI, the defendant above, and that I know
defendant has read the statement or that I have read it to defendant; I have discussed it with defendant and
believe that defendant fully understands the moaning of its contents and is menially and physically
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of
4
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the crimc(s) and tho factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct arc correctly stated; and these,
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant iiUh^fbfcgbfii^a^fidaYit, are
accurate and true.
/*^V\ / ?
I (fj

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
J certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against EbDEE G. KUCHARSKf,
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's
criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats,
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in
the Statement and m the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court.
"lliere is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the
offense(s) for which the pica is entered and that the acceptance of theri6a>j>6uldserve the public interest.

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and
counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the Signatures and finds that
the defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the cnme(s) set forth in the
Statement
tement be accepted and entered,
,. J
Dated this

5
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FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT OR THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS THAT SAYS THAT A JUC)GE WHO ASKS THESE
QUESTIONS, GOES THROUGH WHAT THE JUDGE IS SUPPOSED TO GO
TROUGH WITH THIS FORM OF PLEA AFFIDAVIT TFlAT WE HAVE, AND
GETS STATEMENTS FROM THE DEFENDANT, I BELiEVE THAT THERE'S
NO -- NO STANDARD THAT SAYS THAT I HAVE T(j) THEN GO BACK
SECONDHAND AND SAY IF SOMEBODY LATER AFTEft THE FACT SAYS,
JUDGE, WHAT I TOLD YOU WAS A LIE AND I REALLY DIDN'T MEAN IT,
THAT IT CAN'T BE —

I CAN'T SEE HOW IT CA^J BE A SUBJECTIVE

STANDARD BECAUSE IF IT IS A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD, THEN EVERY
PERSON THAT WE HAVE ASKED AND GONE THROUGfji, YOU KNOW,
HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS OF DEFENDANTS OVER THE
LAST NUMBER OF YEARS, THEN EVERY ONE OF TflEM CAN COME BACK
AND SAY, WELL, JUDGE, DESPITE THAT, THAT iftfASN' T TRUE.

AND I

DON'T FIND A BASIS BOTH EITHER IN THE TEStlMONY OR IN THE
VIDEOTAPE OR IN THE RECORD TO INDICATE TH^T THIS WASN'T
KNOWING, VOLUNTARILY, AND KNOWINGLY MADE, AS THE REQUIREMENT
THAT I HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE DEFENDANT DOES ENTER A PLEA
THAT WAY.
SO I'M DENYING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA.

HAVING

DENIED THAT MOTION, THE MOTION TO DISMISS! IS REALLY MOOT.
IN LIGHT OF THAT THEN —

I GUESS WE'VE NE^/ER HAD A

PRESENTENCE REPORT, HAVE WE?
MR. LARSEN:
THE COURT:
—

I DON'T BELIEVE SO, YOUjR HONOR.
OKAY.

THEN, I'M GOING T|O ASK THAT A
1

SO
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PRESENTENCE REPORT BE PREPARED AND SENTENCING TAKE PLACE ON
NOVEMBER 30TH.

IS THAT AGREEABLE TO ALL PARTIES?

MR. LARSEN:
THE COURT:

YES, YOUR HONOR.
OKAY.

MR. JARDINE:
THE COURT:

COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE?

LET ME LOOK HERE.
THAT'S A THURSDAY.

MR. JARDINE:

I HAVE THE AFTERNOON AVAILABLE IF THAT'S

WHEN IT IS —
THE COURT:

YES, ONE O'CLOCK.

MR. JARDINE:
THE COURT:

DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ELSE THAT AFTERNOON.
OKAY.

1 P.M. ON THE 30TH?

OKAY.

ANYTHING

FURTHER ON THIS MATTER?
MR. JARDINE:
THE COURT:

NO, YOUR HONOR.
OKAY.

THANK YOU.
*****

FARMINGTON, UTAH
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. JARDINE:

NOVEMBER 30, 2006

WELL, WHAT —

WHAT DO WE HAVE LEFT?

WE HAVE A MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE ON A

SENTENCING, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

WHICH ONE IS THAT?

MR. JARDINE:
THE COURT:

KUCHARSKI, NUMBER 15 (UNINTELLIGIBLE).
WHICH NUMBER?

MR. JARDINE:
THE COURT:
MR. JARDINE:

NUMBER 15.
STATE OF UTAH VERSUS EDDIE KUCHARSKI.
IF I MAY, YOUR HONOR.
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MAR 13 2007
Uyton Diitrict Court
N&ifaanN. Janiinc, USB No. 8215
The Law OfScec of Nkthan N. Jardioc
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/994-9985
Fax: 801/519-8745
Attorney for Defendant, Eddie Q. Kucharski

CTTHE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS C0UNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT. STATE OF U^AH
State of Utah
Objection to Prejseatence Report
Plaintiff,
va.
Case No, 04-17^11630

Eddie Kucharski

Judge Thomas l[. Kay

Defendant

...in.

*•

—•

1

'

•

,„i • . « • . . .

,,..

TO ALL PARTIES AND TBECR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD;
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Eddie Kucharski by and through h^ attorney of record, Nathan
NL Jardine, hereby objects to the Presentence Report dated February 16,20(^7, for the following reasons:
1, On page 2* the second fiill paragraph, the Presentence Report indicates that Eddie Kucharski
purchased a vehicle with a $38,000.00 bad check. Mr. Kucharski relates th^t in June or July of 2007* he
purchased a vehicle from Quality Dodge in Tooele, Utah. At the time he pi^chased the vehicle^ he
issued a check with the understanding that the check would not be cashed ujtfil Mr. Kucharski received
ftmds from a sponsor. Eddie Kucharski is the manager/owner of H&^Motbr Sports. H&K Motor
Sports is involved in the Nascar team business. Mr, Knchaxski's business clwns several different race

041701630

CDf95124J8
KUCHARSKf,£pCM£ G

Z / ^C0OWV9^O'-UZ0OZ/O2/C

FEB-28-2007 WED 04:47 PM NATHAN N JARDINE

*$198745

P 003/012

cars and teams* Mr. Kucharski believed at the time that they check was issued that ha would be able to
have the $38,000.00 within a three-week timeframebecause he anticipated the^Mes^omingJn^nom^
^neufthe^p^sSsof one of his teams. Mr. Kucharski was arrested while they were awaiting for the
money to oome infromthe sponsor. The car dealership understood the dynamics of this situation and
bleached his agreement by cashing the check which is why, in part, the matter was dismissed.
2. Mr. Kucharski indicates that at the first court appearance in this matter the prosecution told
him that they were in the process of dismissing the matter. Three weeks later, the matter was dismissed,
The car dealer was not out any money whatsoever due to the feet that Mr, Kucharski paid him for
depreciation on the car. The statement in the Presentence Report that the district attorney had to actually
file felony charges in order for the defendant to agree to return the vehicle is incorrect and inaccurate.
3. Defendant objects to the second Ml paragraph on page 2 ofthe Presentence Report which
starts "A^tud^OriMitatiQn.* In that paragraph, the Presentence Report indicates "The defendant7s
explanation of the offense is completely contradictory to that of his victim and to the employer he
exploited," Eddie Kucharski believes that he did not exploit his employer. This offense arose from a
situation where Eddie Kucharski worked for Champion Windows and Patios (Champion). He agreed
with the manager of Champion, Greg Shuaoway, that he could do some window joba on the side. Greg
Shunoway agreed that Eddie Kucharski could do the window jobs with the only stipulation that they
purchased the windows from Champion. One of the people that Eddie Kucharski agreed thai he would
do a window job for was a person by the name of Lanny Hansen who is the victim in this case. Eddie
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Kucharsid agreed with Lanny Hansen that he would do the windowjobftyr Lanny Hansen. Hetooka
deposit from Lanny Hansen. He asked Greg Shunoway to order the wind|)w3>^mX3ieg^SkifflowayTSeva
ordered the windows.^Consequeatfy,^^^

could not install tfye windows in Lanny Hansen's

home. Aa a result ofthe windows not being installed. Lanny Hansen vms| unhappy and made a criminal
complaint against Eddie Kucharski. Eddie Kucharski then has had to fao^ the criminal charges. The
employer in this matter, Champion, was not exploited. In feet, the employer wronged Eddie Kucharsid.
4. It is Eddie Kucharski's understanding that both he and Champion were sued as a result of the
problem. Eddie Kucharsid was informed by Brett Klackston that Champion had actually cut a check to
Lanny Hansen in settlement of the matter,
5. Prom the day that Eddie Kucharski received the service of a lawsuit, until the day that he was
supposed to be sentenced last year, he Indicates that be was in negotiation^ with the civil attorney far
Lanny Hansen in order to resolve the matter. He offered to install windows fiom a different company
and he offered to make substantial payments since he no longer had the deposit given him by Lanny
Hansen, but nothing was ever finalized between himself and Lanny Hansen's attorney.
6. On page 2, the second sentence of the"Attitude-Orientation" paragraph* the Presentence
Report Investigator indicates "He claims to have 'returned the deposit* in Ijiis statement of the offense,*1
The feet of the matter is that a careful reading of the defendant's statement! of the offense could lead to
the conclusion that when Eddie Kucharskl indicated that he ''returned the deposit he was talking about
the deposit for a different job, not the job related to the Lanny Hansen ordfr
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As a matter of clearing up the Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski hereby informs the court that
at the time that he took on the job for Lanny Hansen, he also took on a paxiojob^tApersoariythrMme
of Greg Williams. AtJfcejsame^bcaelxe^ms doing the job for Greg Williams he found out that he
couldn't get the materials through Champion. As a result of that he couldnt get the materials so at that
point Eddie Kucharski returned .the deposit cm the patio job for ChegWUlian^
deposit on the window job for Lanny Hansen because Gisg Shunoway was still Indicating at thai point
that the windows were going to be forthcoming, but they never were. In any evexd, there b a statement
in the Presentence Report that indicates he claims to have "returned the deposit/ The reality is that
when Eddie Kucharski claims to return the deposit, he was talking about the deposit to Qreg Williams
for the patio job, not the deposit to Lanay Hansen for the window job,
7. In thefourthsentence of the Attitude^Qrientation paragraph, the Presentence Report
Investigator indicates "The defendant actually tries to absolve himself from full responsibility by placing
blame on his manager at the time/ Even in Eddie Kucharsld's statement, he indicates that he feels bad,
"1feelhorrible that Lanny lost money. That was never intended.... I am working two jobs to pay Laxmy
back." Obviously, Eddie Kucharski is not trying to absolve himself from full responsibility by placing
blame on the manager at the time. Clearly, however, the manager was at fault Eddie Kucharski
indicates that the manager wasfired,terminated from his job, due to the dealings that occurred with
respect to this matter and for other similar reasons.
8. Eddie Kucharski disputes sentence 5 of the A^fofo-Qneftfetion paragraph of the Presentence
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Report which indicates that "The fact is he never submitted the work ordeif for the windows, insisted that
the victim issue the checks directly to himself, and then cashed the checks IthroujJxhis^ersotadxh^B^
account" Tliefeerjofthe-fflatteri^

to the arrangement that E^die Kucharski had with the

manager at the time, Greg Shuaoway* he was to tell Greg that there were Windows and more materials
that were needed, and Greg Shuno way was to order those windows or materials. Eddie Kucharski would
then receive the materials and do the job on his own time. That was the arrangement thai Eddie
Kucharski had with bis manager, It was a win-win situation for all. Champion would receive money for
the materials that were ordered from them and Eddie Kucharski would mal^e money on the side.
However, there was never an arrangement between Eddie Kucharski and tlie manager of the store, Greg
Shnnoway, that he would submit a work order for the windows. That was hot part of the arrangement.
The Presentence Report makes it seem as though Eddie Kucharski should have issued a work order for
the windows*
Of course, the victim, Lanny Hansen, was required to pay Eddie Kucharski directly for the work
due to the fact that Eddie Kucharski was not working for Champion when $c agreed to install the
windows, rather he was working for himself as an independent contractor, ^ddie Kucharski arranged for
the windows and materials to be delivered from Champion and was going tb perform the work himself.
Of course, the victim was to pay him directly for the windows, Eddie Kucharski did not cash the
payment for the windows through his personal checking account, in feet, E4die Kucharski cashed the
checks through Lanny Hansen's checking account He juat simply cashed tlie checks that were delivered
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to him by his customer.
9. The last sentence in the Attitude-Orientation paragraph indicates "The drf^dant^at^tude-acd'
orientation is to miaiini2£4is4nvolvBm^

The fact of the matter is that the defrnriflnfa

attitude is to clear up what actaaUy CKxurred asforas the

Eddie

Kuchatrski knows and understands that he should not have spent the money that was given to him. He
knows that it was a big mistake to use the money for his personal use when he should have reserved it to
do the job for which he was hired, He recognizes that that was one of the biggest mistakes of his life due
to the foot that he did not have the money to Lanny Hansen when Greg Shunoway failed to order the
windows and the windows were never delivered- Eddie Kuchaxski has now spent 87 days in jail due to
this matter.
The reason Eddie Kucharski was performing side jobs is because he needed extra money because
his son had spent two weeks in the ICU and he had a huge hospital bill to pay. Additionally, Eddie
Kucharski was being promoted in the company he worked for at the same time of the alleged events*
The promotion involved a move to Dallas, Texas* The move was not being paid for by the company, so
Eddie Kucharski used the money for hospital bills and moving expenses for his family. He recognizes,
however, that he should not have used the money for anything except for performing the work for the
customer who had paid him in advance for his services.
As Eddie Kucharski understands it, the work that he was going to do for Lanny Hansen was going
to be done and that the materials were going to be paid for by Champion. Champion was going to be
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taking money out of his paychecks for the cost of the windows. The labor that was going to be
accomplished would be accomplished by Eddie Kucharski, It would b^ve only taken hiauwo-dayslo
completetoejob,
10, With respect to the paragraphs under "INVESTIGATOR C0MMENT* on page 2 of the
Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski admits that the current wrongdoir^g occurred during the time that
he was on supervised probation. He also admits that there were plans f<fr the supervised probation to be
terminated. In fact, the supervised probation was in fact terminated successfully.
Eddie Kucharski did successftdly complete supervised probation^ The feet of the matter i$ thai at
the end of 1997 through the end of 2000, he did rack up a series of crimiinal charges. His probation was
revoked and reinstated twice; however* Eddie Kucharski also believes thiat he will certainly perform well
on probation if he is only given the chance. Once again, his last probation 61d end successfully.
11. Lanny Hansen has told Eddie Kucharski that he is i^coinmenling to the prosecutor and the
court that no additional time be served by Eddie in this matter, Mr, Hausten knew that Eddie Kucharski
was working independentlyfromChampion when he agreed to do the woWc on Lanny Hansen's home.
Mr. Hansen knew that was the reasouhe was getting the windows done a^ a discounted r ^ . Eddie
Kucharski did not teil Lanny Hansen that the windows were a promotional deal as indicated on page 3,
firstfiillparagraph, sentence 3 of the Presentence Report He did tell Lan^y Hansen that he would do
the work cheaper than he could get the work done through Champion. Th£ amount of $10,398.00 was
paid to Eddie Kucharski by Lanny Hansen.
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When Mr. Hansen contacted Eddie Kucharski, as indicated on page 3, in thefirstMl paragraph
of the Presentence Report Eddie Kucharski did inform Mr. Hansen the work hadiM>ea^Lelayedl50eaus^
he had afemilyjdeatlHn^allasrrexas,and the delay was also caused by the fact that he hadn't received
the windowsfromChampion yet.
Yet, the manager of Champion, Greg Shunoway, told Lanny Hansen that Eddie Kucharski had
"possibly moved to Arizona*,forthe probable reason that Greg Shunoway wanted to cover up his own
wrongdoing in the matter. As indicated above, ultimately, the manager, Greg Shunoway, wasfiredfrom
his jobforthe dealings that he made in this instance as well as other instances similar to this incident
Of course, the manager of Champion never received a work order due to thefeetthat the work was not
done through Champion, it was done through Eddie Kucharski.
Eddie Kucharski never submitted a work order to Champion. Eddie Kucharski did give Mr.
Hansen a document which indicated the location and measurements of windows. Apparently, Mr.
Hansen sent that document to Champion and was informed that the document was not valid- The
Presentence Report also indicates oa page 3, the second Ml paragraph, the last sentence, "Evidently the
work order had a substantial amount of missing information." Thefeetof the matter is that there was
neverftwork order that was submitted to Champion by Eddie Kucharski orfromMr. Hansen to Eddie
Kucharski. It was only a work sheet where Eddie Kucharski worked out the size of the windows and the
prioe be would need to install the windows.
12, With respect to the third Ml paragraph on page 3 of the Presentence Report Eddie Kucharski
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will provide documents to the court on the day of the sentencing in this chatter which indicate that Eddie
Kucharald did not quit the company on May 27,2006. In fact, te wasfaa^sfeg^o Dallft yTcxa^oBror
about that date.
13. With respect to the fourth foil paragraph on page 3 of the Presentence Report, Eddie
Kucharsld never received any messages which were allegedly left by the police on his "tctftt cell
phone."
14. With respect to paragraph one under "CUSTODY STATUS114>f the Presentence Report,
defendant served 52 days in the Davis County Jail and an additional 30 d^iys in Maricopa County,
Arizona, and an additional 14 days in Tooele County on these charges.
15. Withrespectto paragraph HE. PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY", the feet of the matter is
that from 1999 through 2002, the defendant was having a very difficult tit^e in his life* Hewentthrough
a divorce and was suffering from the mental illness of bipolar disease which was untreated at the time.
Many of the criminal offenses that are shown occurredfromthe same episode of criminal history. In
other words, Eddie Kucharsld was not on probation at the time that he coijtfnittcd the offense EXCEPT
for the check that was issued in 2000 and, EXCEPT offense (6) indicated ^>n the Presentence Report
which was committed in 2002. Eddie Kuoharslri is now being treated for iiis bipolar illness with
medication from a psychiatrist at LDS Hospital, He also receives counseling on a monthly basis. He has
remarried and has two children with his current wife. In the event that Ed<|tte Kucharski is required to
serve any significant time in jail or prison, his current wife and children will have no way to payfortheir
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needs.
16. With resect to the "VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AND R E S i m m O N , , - o n ^ ^
the Prefientencc Report, once again, Eddie Kucharski is sorry that the Hansens lost their money. He is
sony that he did not keep the deposit that they paid him so that he could pay it back to them. He did
believe that he was going to be able to accomplish the work for them but he was wrong. He has spoke
with Lanny Hansen who has indicated that Lanny Hansen has no ill feelings towards Eddie Kucharski
and that Lanny Hansen does not want to see Eddie Kucharski incarcerated for another period of time.
17. With respect to the third to the last full paragraph, second sentence, on page 7 of the
Presentence Report, it is indicated "The defendant also works for H&K Motor Sports in their public
relations office." Eddie Kucharski owns H&K Motor Sports. Similarly, sentence 4 of the same
paragraph it states 'Trom 1997 until 2004, the defendant was employed with Computex as a Sales
Representative," Eddie Kucharski owned Computex and was not just a Sales Representative. Eddie
Kucharski was making approximately $100,000.00 per year when he owned Computex, but he did
dissolve the company to start a career in racing cars. He believed at the time and continues to believe
that there is much more money involved in racing cars than there is in. computers*
DATED: February 28,2007

Respectfully sui

Nathan M Jardine
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the February 28,2007, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Objection to Presentence Report was served by facsimile and United States First Class Mail,
postage prepaid, addressed to the following:

Richard L. Larsen, Esq.
Davis County Prosecutor
800 West Stat© Street
P.O. Box 618
Farmington, Utah 84025
Fax: (801)451-4328
Lee Kenney, Investigator
Blake Beesley, Supervisor
Adult Probation and Parole
Farmington A. P. & P.
883 West 100 North
Farmington, UT 84025

Fax No

Nathan N. Jardine

Kv&B&PO0.OtycctlOR to fattcteocc Repottftnj
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